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REFORMING THE IRS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998
I. INTRODUCTION
Last year, members of the Senate Finance Committee listened while
taxpayers told Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") "horror stories" during
three days of hearings.1 At these hearings, taxpayers testified to intru-
sive, unfair, and arbitrary acts committed by the IRS in its efforts to ad-
minister the tax code ("the code").2 Furthermore, IRS agents confessed
in the hearings to an established policy of intimidating weak and poor
taxpayers in order to make examples of them.3 This testimony was the
impetus for the reformation of the IRS.
On July 22, 1998, the President signed into law the IRS Restructur-
ing and Reform Act of 1998 (the "Reform Act").5 The Reform Act is
the most recent Congressional response to the American taxpayer's dis-
satisfaction with the IRS. The Reform Act purports to comprehensively
reform the IRS, making it more user-friendly and more accountable to
taxpayers.' Additionally, the Reform Act is intended to enhance the
fairness of the tax collection process, solve the problems created by the
complicated code, and restore public confidence in the way the IRS en-
1. See IRS Restructuring: Hearings on Internal Revenue Service Restructuring Before the
Senate Finance Comm., 105th Cong., (1998) (statement of Robert S. Schriebman), available in
1998 WL 47010 (describing examples of abuses such as deprivation of due process, commis-
sion of perjury by agents, and adversarial approach).
2. See Ann Reilly Dowd, Win More at the New IRS, MONEY, Jan. 4,1998, at 82,82. See,
e.g., Hearings on IRS Restructuring and Oversight Before the Senate Finance Committee, 104th
Cong. (1988) (statement of Congressman Rob Portman), available in 1998 WL 8991317;
Hearings on IRS Restructuring and Oversight Before the Senate Finance Committee, 104th
Cong. (1988) (statement of former IRS Commissioner Donald C. Alexander), available in
1998 WL 8991357.
3. See 143 CONG. REC. H-10029 (daily ed. Nov. 5,1997) (statement of Rep. Paul).
4. See IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, §§ 1001-9016,
112 Stat. 685 (1998) [hereinafter "Reform Act"].
5. See MONDAQ BUSINEss BRIEFING, IRS REFORM ACr SIGNED, Sept. 14,1998, avail-
able in 1998 WL 9018267; Robert Bums, Clinton Signs Popular Bill to Make IRS Simpler,
Fairer, THE ATLANTA CONST., July 23, 1998, at A6. Both the House of Representatives and
the Senate passed the Reform Act by overwhelming margins; the House voted 402-8, while
the Senate voted 96-2. See Jeff A. Schnepper, Restructuring and Reforming the Internal Reve-
nue Service, USA TODAY, Sept. 1,1998 (Magazine), at 15.
6. See 143 CONG. REC. H10001 (daily ed. Nov. 5,1997) (statement of Rep. Dreier).
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forces the code.7 Specifically, the Reform Act shifts the burden of proof
from the taxpayer to the IRS in any court proceeding relating to the de-
termination of tax liability! Also, the Reform Act calls for the estab-
lishment of a nine member IRS Oversight Board.! Congressional spon-
sors of the Reform Act claim that this Oversight Board "will bring
private sector expertise to the management and administration of the
[IRS]."' Finally, the Reform Act intends to extend the rights and pro-
tections of taxpayers by enhancing their ability to sue the IRS for civil
damages."
This Comment examines whether the Reform Act will effectively
address taxpayers' difficulties in dealing with the IRS. It anticipates the
Reform Act's effect on existing law and on IRS administration. Addi-
tionally, this Comment identifies problems resolved and created by the
Reform Act. Finally, the Comment concludes that: (1) reformation of
the IRS is necessary; (2) the Reform Act's shifting of the burden of
proof in tax disputes will not substantially assist taxpayers because such
a shift will occur only in limited circumstances and if it does occur, it
may make the IRS more aggressive; (3) the creation of the IRS Over-
sight Board improves oversight and guidance of the IRS only margin-
ally; yet, the language of the Reform Act which creates the board is not
broad enough to make the IRS significantly more accountable to tax-
payers; and (4) the Reform Act will not substantially enhance taxpayer
ability to sue the government for damages caused by IRS employees'
wrongful conduct, as many of the limitations of the amended statutes
will persist.
This Comment has five main sections. Part II discusses the Reform
Act's origins, three of its major provisions, and the reasons for its en-
actment. Part III examines the Reform Act's shift of the burden of
proof from the taxpayer to the IRS in any tax proceeding. Specifically,
this section analyzes the rationale for the traditional assignment of the
burden of proof on the taxpayer and assesses the anticipated effects of a
shift to the IRS. Part IV critiques the utility of the IRS Oversight Board
created by the Reform Act. This section examines the role of advisory
committees in the administration of federal government and enumerates
the responsibilities and duties assigned to the IRS Oversight Board by
7. See id.
8. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 3001, 112 Stat. 726.
9. See id. at § 1101, 112 Stat. 685, 691 (amending § 7802(b)(1)).
10. 143 CONG. REC. H10002 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1997) (statement of Rep. Frost).
11. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at §§ 3101-3102, 112 Stat. 730.
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the Reform Act. Part V discusses traditional civil remedies available to
taxpayers and focuses on two civil remedies the Reform Act amends.
Finally, Part VI assesses the effectiveness of the Reform Act's major
provisions in light of taxpayer dissatisfaction with the IRS. It suggests
that further legislative modifications be considered by Congress in its fu-
ture attempts to reform the IRS and lessen the American tax problem.
II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Congressional attempts to reform the IRS are more than a product
of recent taxpayer protests.2 In 1988 and 1996, Congress enacted Tax-
payer Bill of Rights legislation to make procedural safeguards and
remedies available to taxpayers.' Additionally, Congress subsidized an
IRS reorganization program called the Tax Systems Modernization Pro-
gram (the "TSM program").14 The TSM program attempted to reform
the IRS by implementing a series of projects aimed at modernizing the
IRS and preparing it to handle the challenges of administering the tax
system in the 1990s.'
In the opinion of a majority of American taxpayers, these attempts
to reform the IRS have not succeeded. 6 The TSM program has been
characterized as "chaotic" and "ad hoc" and is running substantially
over budget.'7 Also, taxpayers continue to come forward with horror
stories detailing abusive tactics employed by IRS agents. In response
to these stories, one member of Congress conceded that the IRS "is an
12. See generally Creighton R. Meland, Jr., Omnibus Taxpayers' Bill of Rights Act. Tax-
payers' Remedy or Political Placebo? 86 MICH. L. REv. 1787,1789-91 (1988).
13. See Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 100-647, Title VI Subtitle J, 102 Stat. 3730
(1988); Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168,110 Stat. 1452 (1996). For a more thor-
ough discussion on the Taxpayer Bill of Rights legislation of 1988 see Meland, supra note 12.
14. See generally Margaret Milner Richardson, Reinventing the Internal Revenue Service,
1994 FED. B.A. SEC. TAX'N REP. 1.
15. See id. Specifically, the TSM program attempts to reorganize the IRS by replacing
archaic computer equipment, restructuring and reducing the size of the IRS's national and
regional offices, creating program areas responsible for the implementation of long range
strategies and objectives, and consolidating technological resources. See id. at 1-2.
16. See Dowd, supra note 2, at 82. In a November 1997 poll, 48% of the respondents
said the IRS needed to be completely overhauled. Additionally, another 10% said the agency
should be eliminated altogether. See id.
17. See James J. Hall, Critics Blast IRS's Tax Systems Modernization Program, West's
Legal News, available in 1996 WL 259761 (April 12,1996).
18. See IRS Restructuring: Hearings on Internal Revenue Service Restructuring Before
the Senate Finance Comm., 105th Cong., (Feb. 5, 1998) (statement of Robert S. Schriebman)
available in 1998 WL 47010.
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agency out of control."'9
The IRS Reform and Reconstruction Act of 1998 seeks to reform
the IRS where the Taxpayer Bill of Rights legislation, the TSM pro-
gram, and other reformation attempts have failed. Members of Con-
gress assert that the Reform Act is the most comprehensive reform of
the IRS in over four decades.20 Sponsors of the Reform Act claim that
this legislation confronts a basic problem that previous reformation ef-
forts have not addressed: the complexities of the Internal Revenue
Code. ' These sponsors claim that the Reform Act will serve as the first
step in resolving those complexities." The Reform Act contains provi-
sions which are intended to "substantially strengthen taxpayers' rights in
dealing with the IRS." 3 Although sponsors assert that what ails the IRS
can only be solved by replacing the code with a new tax system.4 They
also believe that in the interim the Reform Act will provide more fair
treatment and efficient customer service for taxpayers.'
The Reform Act facilitates a comprehensive reform of the IRS
through the adoption and amendment of numerous sections of the code.
This Comment focuses on three sections of the Reform Act and their
role in the reformation of the IRS. These sections of the Reform Act
are: (1) shifting the burden of proof in a tax dispute from the taxpayer
to the IRS;' (2) creating an IRS Oversight Board;' and (3) enhancing
taxpayers' rights to sue the government for civil damages.'
III. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
This section discusses the provisions of the Reform Act which shift
19. 143 CONG. REC. H10042 (daily ed. Nov. 5,1997) (statement of Rep. Crane).
20. See 143 CONG. REc. H10001 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1997) (statement of Rep. Dreier).
21. See id. at H10024 (statement of Rep. Camp) (stating that the code has over 17,000
pages of laws and regulations, 480 forms, and 280 forms explaining those forms); see also
DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF 19 (1989). Burnham indicates that Congressional
attempts to reform the IRS have resulted in a tax code "printed on 2,200 pages, not including
the 7,600 pages of regulations, which also have the force of the law." Id. For a summary of
previous Congressional reformation attempts, see Shirley D. Peterson, Essay, Reform and
Reinvention: The Internal Revenue Code and the Internal Revenue Service, 47 SMU L. REV.
51,52 (1993) (citing DAVID F. BRADFORD, U.S. TREASURY DEPT. BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC
TAX REFORM (2d ed. 1984)).
22- See 143 CONG. REC. H10022 (daily ed. Nov. 5,1997) (statement of Rep. Archer).
23. Id. at H10002 (statement of Rep. Frost).
24. See id. at H10022 (statement of Rep. Archer).
25. See id. at H10004 (statement of Rep. Christensen).
26. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 3001, 112 Stat. 726.
27. See id § 1101, 112 Stat. 691.
28. See id §§ 3101, 3102, 112 Stat. 727, 730.
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the burden of proof in any court proceeding relating to a tax dispute.29
It examines the rationale for assigning the taxpayer the burden of proof,
the language of the Reform Act which shifts the burden to the IRS, and
the anticipated effects of such a shift. This section concludes that this
provision of the Reform Act is an ineffective attempt to reapportion
power from the IRS to taxpayers and that shifting the burden of proof
may cause the IRS to become more aggressive in its operating proce-
dures.
A. The Burden of Proof and Rationale for its Assignment in a Tax
Proceeding
The role of the burden of proof is fundamental in resolving disputes
between parties.O A party with the obligation to persuade a neutral
third party that he or she acted or refrained from acting in conformity
"with a predetermined pattern of conduct[,]"' bears the burden of
proof." If a party with the burden of proof is unable to meet its obliga-
tion, the issue will be decided against that party.33
A tax dispute can proceed in three venues: the Tax Court, a federal
district court, or the Claims Court? Generally, the taxpayer has borne
the burden of proof in each of these venues. s In Tax Court, a taxpayer
must prove that the commissioner's assessment of tax is incorrect.36 In a
federal district court or the Claims Court, a taxpayer is required to
prove that the commissioner's assessment of tax is incorrect and the
taxpayer must show the amount to which he is entitled or, in the alterna-
tive, that he owes no tax at all.
29. See § 3001,112 Stat. at 726.
30. See Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric: Shifting the Burden of
Proof in Tax Cases, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 245 (1988) (citing C. CHAMBERLAYNE, A
TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 931, at 1093 (1911)).
31. Martinez, supra note 30, at 244.
32. See id, (citing JAMES & HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 7.6, at 314 (3d ed. 1985));
see also MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 336, at 947-48 (3d ed. 1984); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2485, at 285 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1981).
33. See Martinez, supra note 30, at 244; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 947-48;
WIGMORE, supra note 32, at 285.
34. See Martinez, supra note 30, at 255.
35. See Martinez, supra note 30, at 257.
36. See Martinez, supra note 30, at 257 (citing Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 515
(1934)); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The taxpayer has also been assigned
the burden of proof in tax court cases by Tax Court Rule 142. See TAX Cr. R. 142. The rule
states: "The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner, except as otherwise provided by
statute or determined by the Court...." Id. at 142(a).
37. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976) (holding that a taxpayer who
1999)
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With respect to the common law rationale for assigning taxpayers
the burden of proof,38 Leo Martinez explains that courts have assigned
the burden of proof after determining which party must show the af-
firmative of an issue, which party is the plaintiff, and which party pos-
sesses the objective evidence in a dispute.39
An example of the first factor can be found in Helvering v. Taylor,4°
where Judge Stone opined that in an action to recover taxes paid, the
burden was on the taxpayer "to show not merely that the assessment
was erroneous, but also the amount to which he was entitled., 41 In so
holding, the Court assigned the burden of proof to the party having to
show the affirmative of an issue.42
Furthermore, the common law rationale assigns the burden of proof
to the plaintiff taxpayer in a dispute. 3 In Rockwell v. Commissioner,
44
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "from time immemorial,
the burden of proof-i.e., the burden of persuasion-is on the plain-
tiff.
a45
Finally, courts have assigned taxpayers the burden of proof because
they possess the objective evidence necessary to determine their liabil-
ity.4 In Campbell v. United States,47 the Court stated that a rule based on
fairness "does not place the burden upon a litigant of establishing facts
peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary."' Despite this over-
shows merely that an assessment is somewhat erroneous has not met a burden consisting of
two elements); see also Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1934); Compton v. United
States, 334 F.2d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 1964).
38. See generally Martinez, supra note 30, at 267-73. Martinez discusses other common
law factors for assigning the burden such as which party is alleging the least likely scenario,
which party is alleging the disfavored contention, and an allocation according to statute. See
id.
39. See id.
40. 293 U.S. 507 (1934).
41. Id. at 514.
42. See id; see also Martinez, supra note 30, at 249 (citing Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118,
122 (1877)); Pacific Portland Cement Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 178 F.2d 541, 547
(9th Cir. 1949); Bauer v. Clark, 161 F.2d 397,400 (7th Cir. 1947); Gilmore v. United States, 93
F.2d 774,776 (5th Cir. 1938).
43. See Martinez, supra note 30, at 269 (citing Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514
(1935)); Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101,105 (1927).
44. 512 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1975).
45. Id. at 887.
46. See Martinez, supra note 30, at 271-72. "The common-law allocation of the burden
of proof to the party in possession of the evidence is clearly appropriate." Id. at 272; see also
MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 950; WIGMORE, supra note 32, at 290.
47. 365 U.S. 85 (1961).
48. Id. at 96.
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whelming amount of common law authority for placing the burden of
proof on taxpayers, the Reform Act nevertheless shifts it to the IRS by
statute.
B. Burden of Proof Under the Reform Act
The Reform Act shifts the burden of proof from the taxpayer to the
IRS." Sponsors of the Reform Act claim that the shift no longer permits
the IRS to treat taxpayers as "guilty until proven innocent."' 5 However,
the shift in the burden of proof may not be the big taxpayer victory that
many in Congress perceive it to be.
The shift of the burden of proof provided in the Reform Act will be
limited in its application. The Reform Act provides that a shift of the
burden occurs only if "a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with re-
spect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the tax-
payer .. .. ,,51 Furthermore, the Reform Act defines three requirements
of the taxpayer where the burden of proof shifts to the IRS: A taxpayer
must comply with the requirements of the code "to substantiate any
item;"" must maintain all records required by the code, 3 and cooperate
with reasonable requests by the IRS for "witnesses, information, docu-
ments, meetings and interviews .... ,"4 Thus, a shift in the burden would
not be an absolute certainty for the taxpayer.
C. Effects of Shifting the Burden of Proof
The Reform Act's shift of the burden of proof in any court pro-
ceeding will not facilitate a dramatic reapportionment of power from the
IRS to taxpayers because the shift of the burden will occur in only lim-
ited circumstances. Even if it does occur, it will not relieve taxpayers
from the burden of substantiating items on their tax returns and it will
create other burdens upon them. As previously mentioned, in order to
shift the burden of proof, the Reform Act requires that a taxpayer in-
troduce credible evidence, comply with the requirements of the code,
maintain all records and cooperate with the reasonable requests of the
IRS.5 With respect to the well-known complexities of the code. 6 judi-
49. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 3001,112 Stat. 726.
50. 143 CONG. REC. H10003 (daily ed. Nov. 5,1997) (statement of Rep. Weller).
51. § 3001(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 727.
52. § 3001(a)(2)(A), 112 Stat. at 727.
53. § 3001(a)(2)(B), 112 Stat. at 727.
54. Id.
55. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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cial interpretation of this provision's requirements would undoubtedly
vary, creating uncertainty as to when a shift in the burden of proof
would actually occur. One can easily foresee courts struggling with the
definitions of "credible evidence,"," "substantiation,"58 and "cooperation
with reasonable requests."59
Therefore, the Reform Act's shift of the burden of proof will not
significantly empower taxpayers because they will be required to sub-
stantiate items in their tax returns in order to cause such a shift.' "Sub-
stantiation requirements include any requirement of the Code or regula-
tions that the taxpayer establish an item to the satisfaction of the
Secretary."6 For example, the IRS requires taxpayers to substantiate
charitable contributions and meals, entertainment, and travel expenses
taken on their tax returns.
If a taxpayer substantiates an item on his tax return, the burden of
proof is shifted to the IRS. Thus, it appears as though the taxpayer has
already assumed the burden of proof. In effect, this provision of the Re-
form Act perpetuates the presumption that the IRS's determinations are
correct until rebutted by a taxpayer.63 This presumption would remain
an "effective procedural device" by which the IRS could avoid assuming
the burden of proof by requiring taxpayers to produce evidence substan-
tiating their claims.' Consequently, a shift in the burden of proof may
56. See Peterson, supra note 21, at 51. The former IRS Commissioner stated: "[tihe cur-
rent level of complexity undermines compliance and breeds disrespect for the law and for
those agencies of government charged with its interpretation and administration." Id. at 51-
52; see also BURNHAM, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
57. See Conf. Report on H.R. 2676, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1998, 144 CONG. REC. H5100-01, *H5161 reprinted in RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA, RIA's COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998, 1936 at T 5019 [hereinafter RIA, ANALYSIS
OF THE REFORM ACT]. "Credible evidence is the quality of evidence which, after critical
analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue if no con-
trary evidence were submitted." Id.
58. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
59. See generally RIA, ANALYSIS OF THE REFORM ACT 1936, at 5019. "A necessary
element of cooperating with the Secretary is that the taxpayer must exhaust his or her admin-
istrative remedies (including any appeal rights provided by the IRS)." Id; see also I.R.C. §
6201(d) (1997).
60. See supra notes 52, 61 and accompanying text.
61. See RIA, ANALYSIS OF THE REFORM ACT, supra note 57, at 1937, T 5019.
62. See id. at 1936-37.
63. See generally Sean M. Moran, The Presumption of Correctness: Should the Commis-
sioner be Required to Carry the Initial Burden of Production, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1087
(1987).
64. See id. at 1108.
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not significantly relieve a taxpayer's tax burden.
Additionally, a shift in the burden of proof may prove to be an inef-
fective attempt to assist taxpayers because it may force the IRS to fur-
ther intrude into the lives of taxpayers.0 IRS agents, knowing they
would carry the burden of proof, may want "more records than ever" to
support their claims." Similarly, one commentator stated that in such an
instance, "the IRS would likely use its summons power to collect docu-
ments and testimony from taxpayers more often."67 As a result, taxpay-
ers may bear a "paperwork burden.""
Finally, a shift of the burden of proof may have a negative effect on
the voluntary compliance system employed by the IRS." Under the
voluntary compliance system, the IRS depends upon citizens to "come
forward and meet their obligations under the revenue laws."7 However,
under the Reform Act citizens will have less incentive to voluntarily re-
mit their taxes because they possess the evidence necessary to determine
their own tax liability; yet the IRS will have the burden to prove this tax
liability'
IV. THEIRS OVERSIGHT BOARD
This section focuses on the provisions of the Reform Act creating
the IRS Oversight Board. It will examine the roles that advisory com-
mittees generally assume in the administration of the federal govern-
ment and the particular duties delegated to the IRS Oversight Board by
the Reform Act. Finally, this section concludes that the IRS Oversight
Board will marginally improve oversight and guidance of the IRS.
However, the language of the Reform Act that creates the Oversight
Board is not broad enough to allow the Oversight Board to suggest and
implement changes that will substantially improve IRS management.
65. See Martinez, supra note 30, at 280. Martinez postulates that the IRS would further
intrude upon taxpayers in response to an anticipated increase in taxpayer cheating. See id.;
see also Dowd, supra note 2, at 84; Robert Dodge, Taxing Situation: IRS Agents May Require
More Data To Build Cases, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 13,1998, at El.
66. Dodge, supra note 65, at El.
67. Dowd, supra note 2, at 84.
68. Dodge, supra note 65, at El (quoting James Maule, Villanova University).
69. See Martinez, supra note 30, at 281 (citing United States v. Fowler, 794 F.2d 1446,
1451 (9th Cir. 1986)).
70. Martinez, supra note 30, at 281.
71. See id. at 279.
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A. The Role of Advisory Committees in the Administration of the
Federal Government
Advisory committees, such as the IRS Oversight Board, enable "pri-
vate citizens throughout the country to have a direct voice in national
programs and policies."72 Typically, advisory committee members are
delegated decision-making duties that would otherwise rest with the
government.73 These committees have served as "a useful and beneficial
means of furnishing expert advice, ideas and diverse opinions to the
Federal Government."74 So prevalent is their existence that they have
come to be known as the "fifth branch of government." 75 According to
Professor Harold Abramson, Congress delegates governmental tasks to
advisory committees for four primary reasons: (1) the expertise of per-
sons appointed to the committees;76 (2) the reduced likelihood that advi-
sory committee decisions will be affected by political influence;" (3) the
lesser number of bureaucratic and administrative requirements imposed
upon advisory committees;7' and (4) the consistent and continuous atten-
tion advisory committees can commit to the decision-making process.79
Despite their utility, advisory committees have been criticized for a
number of reasons.' ° Congress has criticized advisory committees as
72. Mary Kathryn Palladino, Ensuring Coverage, Balance, Openness and Ethical Con-
duct For Advisory Committee Members Under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 ADMIN.
L.J. 231, 231 (1991) (citing R. WEGMAN, THE UTILIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES, REPORT OF THE KETTERING FOUNDATION 2(1982)).
73. See David Faure, The Federal Advisory Committee Act: Balanced Representation
and Open Meetings in Conflict With Dispute Resolution, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 489,
489 (1996).
74. 5 U.S.C. app. II § 2(a) (1989).
75. 117 CONG. REC. H2750 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1971) (statement of Rep. Monagan) re-
printed in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT:
SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, at 259 (1978)
[hereinafter FACA SOURCE BOOK]; see also Palladino, supra note 72, at 231.
76. See Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and
Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 178-79 (1989); see also JOHN P.
COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES 18
(1927).
77. See Abramson, supra note 76, at 179-80; see also JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND
LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 4-6 (1980);
JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 111 (1938).
78. See Abramson, supra note 76, at 180; see also COMER, supra note 76, at 16-17.
79. See Abramson, supra note 76, at 180; see also LOUIS JAFFE, CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 35-37 (1965).
80. See Richard 0. Levine, The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 10 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
217, 219 (1973); Faure, supra note 73, at 489-90.
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being "inefficient and wasteful of resources.""1 Additionally, advisory
committees are criticized for making decisions under a "veil of secrecy"
' 2
and contrary to public interest. 3 In response to these allegations, Con-
gress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),' which
was designed to cure the inefficiencies of advisory committees and pre-
vent them from becoming too powerful." However, scrutiny of advisory
committees persists."
B. The Duties of the IRS Oversight Board
Supporters of the Reform Act claim that it creates an oversight
board which "bring[s] private sector expertise to the management and
administration of the [IRS].""5 In general, the Reform Act requires that
the Oversight Board "oversee the Internal Revenue Service in its ad-
ministration, management, conduct, direction, and supervision of the
execution and application of the internal revenue laws .... "89 Specifi-
cally, the Reform Act charges the Oversight Board with the responsibil-
ity of reviewing and approving the IRS budget and the strategic and op-
erational plans of the IRS. 0 Also, the Oversight Board is authorized to
make management recommendations to the President regarding the ap-
pointment of the IRS Commissioner.9' Similarly, the Oversight Board
may review the IRS Commissioner's selection and evaluation of various
81. Levine, supra note 80, at 219 (citing Hearings on Advisory Committees Before the
Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Government Operations Comm., 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 75, pt. 2 at 305-43 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 Senate Hearings]).
82. See Palladino, supra note 72, at 232-33; see also Comm. on Government Operations,
Amending the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946, and for Other Purposes, H.R. REP. No.
85-579, at 5 (1951), reprinted in FACA SOURCE BOOK at 259 (stating additional criticisms of
advisory committees).
83. See Levine, supra note 80, at 219 (citing 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 81, at pt. 3,
at 983-1008 (testimony of Ralph Nader)).
84. The Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. H (1988)).
85. See House Comm. on Government Operations, The Role and Effectiveness of Federal
Advisory Committees, H.R. REP. NO. 1731,91ST CONG., 2D SESS. 4 (1970) reprinted in FACA
SOURCE BOOK at 215.
86. See Levine, supra note 80, at 225.
87. See generally Palladino, supra note 72, at 235-71. Palladino criticizes FACA, con-
tending that it contains language that is difficult to interpret; such as "advisory committee"
and "balanced representation." See id. at 235-36.
88. 143 CONG. REC. H10002 (daily ed. Nov. 5,1997) (statement of Rep. Frost).
89. Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 1101(c)(1), 112 Stat. 693.
90. See id. § 1101(d), 112 Stat. 694.
91. See id. § 1101(d)(3)(A), 112 Stat. 694.
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IRS officials. 9 However, the Reform Act denies the Oversight Board
authority with respect to the "the development and formulation of Fed-
eral tax policy[,] ... law enforcement activities of the Internal Revenue
Service[,J ... [or] specific procurement activities of the Internal Reve-
nue Service."93
Supporters of the Reform Act insist that an oversight board consist-
ing of private citizens will increase the IRS's accountability to taxpay-
ers94 and implement a check on the IRS's powers.95 One Congressman
stated that "[t]his oversight board will have real power and authority-it
won't just be another governmental advisory board."9 Yet, the Reform
Act may not have granted the oversight board enough authority to initi-
ate and oversee the changes necessary to substantially reform the man-
agement of the IRS.
C. Reform of the IRS Through Operation of the IRS Oversight Board
In the past, the Treasury Department has delegated its responsibility
to manage the IRS to the Commissioner of the IRS."' Congress, through
the Reform Act, has chosen to delegate a portion of the Treasury's
managerial responsibilities to the Oversight Board.98 Delegation of
these tasks to the Oversight Board will improve management of the IRS
to a certain degree.99 However, whether this improvement is slight or
substantial may best be determined by analyzing the four primary rea-
sons for Congressional delegation of governmental tasks to advisory
committees. ' 0
1. Citizens Appointed to Advisory Committees are Experts
Congress delegates governmental tasks to the private citizen mem-
bers of advisory committees in deference to their expertise,'1 as well as
92. See id. § 1101(d)(3)(C), 112 Stat. 694.
93. Id. § 1101(c)(2)(A)-(C), 112 Stat. 694.
94. See 143 CONG. REC. H10026 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1997) (statement of Rep. McCrery).
95. See id. at H10023 (statement of Rep. Cardin).
96. Id. at H10005 (statement of Rep. Christensen).
97. See RIA, ANALYSIS OF THE REFORM ACT, supra note 57, at 1902, 5001.
98. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 1101, 112 Stat. 693.
99. See infra Part IV(C).
100. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Abramson writes that "rather than de-
veloping detailed safety and health standards itself, Congress has delegated this complex task
to specialized agencies .... These agencies have the technical staff and expertise to formu-




the likelihood that they have encountered and solved the problems that
require government action'02 However, the expertise of the IRS Over-
sight Board may not be optimally utilized because their authority is lim-
ited. 3 The IRS Oversight Board lacks any authority with respect to the
"basic problem"1° of tax reform, which is revision of the code itself. The
members are not assigned authority relating to the "development and
formulation"' '" of the code. This limitation negates much of the poten-
tial effectiveness of the Oversight Board. The Oversight Board will
probably include members who are experts in tax administration and
compliance."' Yet, without more power, these experts will have no ac-
tive role in the formulation or development of the code."
2. Advisory Committee Members are Insulated from Political Pressures
Congress also delegates responsibilities to members of advisory
committees to reduce political influence over governmental decision-
making tasks.1s It appears the Oversight Board members are ade-
quately isolated from most political pressures. The Oversight Board will
be composed of nine members, °5 six of whom will be "private life"
members."' While each member will be appointed to only a five-year
102. See Abramson, supra note 76, at 179. One commentator stated, "[t]hose perform-
ing the operation or constituting a part of the relation to be regulated are likely to have a
more urgent sense of the problem and the possibilities of effective solution: experience and
experiment lie immediately at hand." Louis Jaffee, Law Making by Private Groups, 51
HARV. L. REV. 201,212 (1937).
103. See infra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
104. See Peterson, supra note 21, at 52.
105. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 1101(c)(2)(A), 112 Stat. 694.
106. The members of the Oversight Board will be appointed based upon their expertise
in the following areas: "(1) management of large service corporations; (2) customer service;
(3) the Federal tax laws, including administration and compliance; (4) information technol-
ogy; (5) organization development; and (6) the needs and concerns of taxpayers." RIA,
ANALYSIS OF THE REFORM Acr, supra note 57, at 1906, 1 5003.
107. The members of the Oversight Board could play an inactive role (Le., informal ad-
vising or recommending) in the development and formulation of the tax code.
108. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. "By granting administrative agencies an
effective independence from the normal political processes, Congress would ensure that ad-
ministrators were free to be impartial in their judgments ... ." FREEDMAN, supra note 77, at
60.
109. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 1101(b)(1), 112 Stat. 691.
110. Id. § 1101(b)(1)(A). "Private life" members are those who are not otherwise gov-
ernment employees. Id. The other three members will be the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Commissioner of the IRS, and "an individual who is a full-time Federal
employee ... ." Id. § 1101(b)(1)(B)-(D), 112 Stat. 691.
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term by the President11 and could be removed from that position at the
President's will;112 it is difficult to imagine political motives affecting the
decision making of the Board members. The private life members will
be subject to certain ethical conduct rules requiring them to file public
financial disclosure reports"' and restricting their post-Board employ-
ment. 4 However, nothing in the Reform Act prohibits a private life
member from continuing to be employed in the private sector. Thus, it
is reasonable to suspect that these members could face a conflict be-
tween their Oversight Board responsibilities and the interests of their
employers during their appointment."5
3. Advisory Committees are Flexible
Congress delegates governmental tasks to advisory committees be-
cause they are typically less constrained by the constitutional and ad-
ministrative restrictions imposed upon governmental agencies. 6
The IRS Oversight Board is a more flexible decision-making body
than the IRS."7 However, the Board may not be able to take advantage
of this flexibility because its members lack "actual authority,'1. such as
the authority to formulate or develop policy."9 Instead, members of the
Oversight Board are limited to exercises of "indirect authority"" such
as conducting strategic and managerial reviews' and making recom-
111. See id. § 1101(b)(2)(B), 112 Stat. 691.
112. See id. § 1101(b)(5)(A), 112 Stat. 693.
113. See id. § 1101(b)(3)(A), 112 Stat. 692; see also 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 101(f) (1997); RIA,
ANALYSIS OF THE REFORM Acr, supra note 57, at 1906-07, 1 5003.
114. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 1101(b)(3)(B), 112 Stat. 692; see also 18 U.S.C. §
207(c) (1997) (offering restrictions on aiding and advising); RIA, ANALYSIS OF THE REFORM
AcT, supra note 57, at 1906-07, 5003.
115. See 143 CONG. REC. H10033 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1997) (statement of Rep. Dreier).
"H.R. 2676 would place management in the hands of people who, however well-meaning, are
loyal and accountable to the firms and businesses that employ them." Id.
116. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. In comparison with administrative agen-
cies, Congress's flexibility in formulating legislation is like "fitting a square peg into a round
hole." COMER, supra note 76, at 16.
117. If for no other reason than the difference in size between the two groups.
118. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 73, 89, and 93.
120. For a discussion on actual and indirect authority see Faure, supra note 73, at 495-96.
Committees that simply advise an agency on policy have indirect authority. See id. These
committees "have more narrow and manageable assignments than do general committees ne-
gotiating broad public policy." Id. (quoting Levine, supra note 80, at 218). A committee ex-
ercising actual authority has the ability to negotiate rulings and in some instances, the ability
to pass regulation. See id.
121. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 1101(d)(1), (d)(3)(B)-(C), 112 Stat. 694.
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mendations to the IRS concerning its policies and plans." The inability
of Oversight Board members to exercise actual authority will lessen its
ability to manage the IRS.
4. Advisory Committees Offer Continuous and Consistent Action
Congress delegates tasks to advisory committees that require con-
tinuous and consistent government action.1' The Oversight Board is not
an advisory committee capable of providing this type of action to the
management and guidance of the IRS. The members of the Oversight
Board are more akin to part-time advisors. 24 They will be minimally
compensated" and only be required to meet quarterly) 1
In sum, it appears that the Oversight Board's ability to manage and
guide the IRS is questionable. The Reform Act limits the decision-
making authority of the members, effectively diminishing contributions
from expert members. Additionally, the Oversight Board does not seem
capable of providing continuous and consistent action to the guidance
and management of the IRS.
Despite these limitations, the Oversight Board should provide some
help to the IRS by offering advice and recommendations to the IRS.
Additionally, these members have the potential to improve the IRS by
providing it with unique extra-governmental ideas. Finally, the Board is
in a position to improve the image of the IRS merely by making its pur-
pose known to the public.
V. ENHANCED CIVIL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO TAXPAYERS
This section examines the provisions of the Reform Act intended to
enhance a taxpayer's ability to sue the government for civil damages
caused by IRS employees.2' In particular, this section discusses two civil
damage remedies available to taxpayers via the code,2 the changes to
122. See id. § 1101(d)(3)(A); 112 Stat. 694.
123. See supra note 80 and accompanying text; see also COMER, supra note 76, at 16-17.
Comer indicates that the legislation promulgated by advisory committees has a greater value
than the legislation promulgated by the other "fickle popular bodies" because advisory com-
mittees have a greater permanence and continuity than these other law makers. Id.
124. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 1101(e)(1)(A), (f)(3), 112 Stat. 695.
125. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 1101(e)(1)(A), 112 Stat. 695. Each member of
the board shall not be compensated in excess of $30,000 per year. See id.
126. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 1101(f)(2), 112 Stat. 695.
127. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at §§ 3101-3102,112 Stat. 727-31.
128. This Comment discusses code sections 7430 and 7433. It does not discuss the civil
remedies available to a taxpayer under code sections 7431 and 7432.
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these remedies, and the effect the amended remedies have on a tax-
payer's ability to successfully sue the government for civil damages. Fi-
nally, this section concludes that the amendments will only minimally
enhance the taxpayer's ability to collect damages from the government
in cases of IRS misconduct. These amendments are not thorough
enough to advance taxpayers' interests or facilitate substantial IRS re-
form.
A. General Civil Remedies Available to Taxpayers
In 1976, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act 29 in response to an increasing awareness of IRS misconduct.' 3 Since
then, Congress has enacted additional legislation extending a taxpayer's
ability to sue the government for damages created by IRS misconduct.'
This legislation includes statutes awarding taxpayers civil damages
against the IRS for "unauthorized disclosure of returns and return in-
formation,, 132 its "failure to release [a] lien,, 133 and for "certain unau-
thorized collection actions. '"" Although these statutes appear to pro-
vide broad remedies to taxpayers, courts and commentators have
persistently criticized the statutes for their ambiguous provisions,' 35
broad restrictions, 13' and limited effectiveness in assisting taxpayers."
1. Section 7430: Damages for Attorney's Fees
Section 7430 provides that reasonable attorney's fees and adminis-
trative costs may be awarded to a party prevailing against the United
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This act represented the initial authority by which a court
could award reasonable costs to parties prevailing against the government in a civil tax litiga-
tion case. See Jerome S. Horvitz & Annette Hebble, "Substantial Justification" Further De-
fined by Phillips, 6 AKRON TAX J. 1, 2 (1989).
130. See R. Tracy Sprouls, IRC §§ 7431 and 7433: Civil Remedies for Abusive Practices
by the IRS, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 563,564 (1993).
131. For example, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights Acts. See supra note 13 and accompany-
ing text.
132. I.R.C. §§ 7431,7432,7433 (1997).
133. Id. § 7432.
134. Id. § 7433.
135. See generally Dani Michele Miller, Can the Internal Revenue Service be Held Ac-
countable for its Administrative Conduct? The LR.C. Section 7430 Fee Recovery Controversy,
18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 371,377 (1988).
136. See generally Sprouls, supra note 130; James T. Towe, Is the IRS Above the Law?
Potential Remedies for Taxpayers Damaged by Unlawful Conduct, 55 MoNT. L. REV. 469,
499-500 (1994).
137. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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States in any civil tax proceeding3' A taxpayer's ability to collect an
award under the section is dependent upon a court's determination that
"(1) the.., position of the Government in the proceedings was not sub-
stantially justified, (2) the taxpayer exhausted the administrative reme-
dies available to him, and (3) the taxpayer 'substantially prevailed' in
the proceeding."'3 9
Courts have inconsistently interpreted section 743040 because of a
"discrepancy between the statute's language and its legislative his-
tory., 141 While the language of the section plainly provides that taxpay-
ers may be awarded attorney's fees when they prevail against the IRS,'42
its legislative history is inconsistent; it both reinforces and takes away
from this language. The section's legislative history indicates that it was
added to the code to "deter abusive actions or overreaching by the In-
ternal Revenue Service .... .1 43 However, the history also indicates that
it was not added to the code "to open the floodgates for fee recovery
from the IRS."' 44
2. Section 7433, Damages for Unauthorized Collection Actions
Section 7433 provides that, in connection with the collection of taxes,
a taxpayer may be awarded damages where an IRS employee recklessly
or intentionally disregards the laws of the code.45 To recover an award
under section 7433, a taxpayer must show:
(1) that an officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service
(2) disregarded a provision of the Internal Revenue Code or any
regulation promulgated thereunder; (3) that this disregard was
reckless or intentional; (4) that the disregard occurred in connec-
tion with the collection of federal tax with respect to the plaintiff;
138. See I.R.C. § 7430(a) (1997).
139. Horvitz & Hebble, supra note 129, at 4; see also I.R.C. § 7430(a) (1997).
140. For a general discussion on section 7430 and the difficulties in interpreting it, see
Horvitz & Hebble, supra note 129, at 1; and Miller, supra note 135, at 371,377.
141. Miller, supra 135, at 373; see also H.R. REP. No. 97-404, at 11 (1981).
142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
143. H.R. REP. No. 97-404, at 11 (1981).
144. Miller, supra note 135, at 375; see also H.R. REP. No. 97-404, at 11 (1981). Con-
gress indicated that the IRS "should not necessarily be penalized for the reasonable pursuit of
debatable tax issues. Tax administration would be ineffective if the Government conceded on
all close cases to the taxpayer in order to avoid payment of fee awards." Description of Law
and Bills Relating to Awards of Attorney's Fees in Tax Cases, Joint Comm. on Taxation, 97th
Cong. 7 (1981).
145. See I.R.C. § 7433(a) (1997).
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and (5) that the disregard was the proximate result of actual di-
rect economic damages sustained by the plaintiff.1'4
If taxpayers are able to prove all the elements of section 7433, they are
entitled to damages not to exceed $1,000,000.4"
Section 7433 has been the subject of significant criticism."4 It pro-
vides a remedy only to those taxpayers who prove IRS employees have
recklessly or intentionally disregarded the code. 149 Additionally, puni-
tive damages are not awarded under this section." Instead, damage
awards are limited to "actual, direct economic damages. 1 51 Finally, sec-
tion 7433 targets only IRS misconduct occurring in connection with col-
lection activities.
1 52
B. Proposed Amendments to Sections 7430 and 7433
By amending code sections 7430 and 7433, the Reform Act intends
to enhance the list of taxpayer rights and protections that must be re-
spected by the IRS when it exercises its collection and investigatory ac-
tivities (known as the Taxpayer Bill of Rights). 3
1. Amended Section 7430
The Reform Act expands the authority of section 7430 to award
damages to taxpayers when the IRS "is wrong.'i4 Under the previous
version of this section, a court had the authority to award higher attor-
ney's fees based upon the determination of a special factor, "such as the
limited availability of qualified attorneys for such [a] proceeding ....
146. Sprouls, supra note 130, at 589-90; see also I.R.C. § 7433(a)(b) (1997).
147. See I.R.C. § 7433(b) (1997).
148. See generally Sprouls, supra note 130, at 565 (criticizing section 7433 for large and
unjustifiable gaps in its coverage); Towe, supra note 136, at 499-500 (criticizing section 7433
for shortcomings that limit its ability to provide a complete remedy for damaged claimants).
149. See I.R.C. § 7433(a) (1997); Sprouls, supra note 130, at 592. "It will not suffice to
show that the actions were negligent, or even grossly negligent." Id.
150. See I.R.C. § 7433 (1997); Sprouls, supra note 130, at 592; Towe, supra note 136, at
499-500.
151. I.R.C. § 7433(b)(1) (1997).
152. See id. § 7433(a); Sprouls, supra note 130, at 590. "Abuses connected with the as-
sessment process are not covered and no action will lie, regardless of how grievous the abuses
may be." Id.
153. See 143 CONG. REC. H10024 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1997) (statement of Rep. Cardin),
143 CONG. REC. H10002 (daily ed. Nov. 5,1997) (statement of Rep. Frost) ("This legislation
... will substantially strengthen taxpayers rights in dealing with the IRS.").
154. See id. at H10026 (statement of Rep. McCrery).
155. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) (1997).
[Vol. 82:405
REFORMING THE IRS
The amended section expands a court's authority to award higher attor-
ney's fees by creating additional special factors, such as "the difficulty of
the issues presented in the case, or the local availability of tax expertise
.... '6 Additionally, amended section 7430 broadens the definition of
the term reasonable administrative costs.'s Similarly, the amendment
broadens the definition of "attorney's fees" ' to include amounts
deemed appropriate for the services of an attorney working on a pro
bono basis. 9 Finally, amended section 7430 includes a provision to as-
sist a court in determining whether the government's position was sub-
stantially justified in a proceeding 60 This provision allows a court to
take into account "whether the [government] has lost in courts of appeal
... on substantially similar issues."
16
'
2. Amended Section 7433
The Reform Act amends section 7433 by increasing a taxpayer's
ability to sue the government for unauthorized collections actions." A
taxpayer is allowed to proceed under the section when an employee of
the IRS negligently disregards the tax code.'6 Additionally, the
amended statute re-establishes the requirement that taxpayers exhaust
all available administrative remedies before obtaining a judgment fordamages." 4
C. Effects of the Amended Civil Remedies
Congress amended sections 7430 and 7433 of the tax code with in-
tentions "to prevent [and] discourage abusive behavior by IRS employ-
ees... [and] to clarify and codify the protections available to taxpayers
in proceedings with the IRS .. ..,,6' Whether the amendments will meet
Congress's intentions may best be determined by examining how the
amendments address the criticisms of these sections of the tax code.
156. Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 3101(a)(2), 112 Stat. 727-728.
157. See id. § 3101(b), 112 Stat. 728.
158. Id. § 3101(c)(3), 112 Stat. 728.
159. See id. § 3101(c)(3)(B), 112 Stat. 728.
160. See id. § 3101(d), 112 Stat. 728.
161. Id.
162. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 3102,112 Stat. 730.
163. See id. § 3102(a)(1)(A), 112 Stat. 728. However, the government's liability is
capped at $100,000 when a taxpayer proceeds under a theory of negligence. See id. §
3102(b)(1), 112 Stat. 730.
164. See id. § 3102(a)(2), 112 Stat. 730.
165. 143 CoNG. REC. H10026 (daily ed. Nov. 5,1997) (statement of Rep. Coyne).
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1. The Effectiveness of Amended Section 7430 as a Civil Remedy
Section 7430 has been criticized for the discrepancy between its lan-
guage and legislative history16 that has resulted in inconsistent interpre-
tation by courts.'67 While the Reform Act clarifies the language of the
section, the changes are not substantial enough to remedy the section's
real problem, its conflicting legislative history.
The Reform Act includes criteria to assist a court in determining
whether a position of the government in a proceeding is "substantially
justified."' ' Specifically, a court is directed to "take into account
whether the United States has lost in courts of appeals for other circuits
on substantially similar issues[.]"'69 This eliminates attempts by the gov-
ernment to create a conflict among the appellate courts.7 Previously,
such attempts could be considered substantially justified even though
another court may have ruled against the government on the same is-
sue.17' This provision enhances a taxpayer's ability to collect damages
from the government. However, Congress does not change the lan-
guage of section 7430 enough to resolve the discrepancy in its legislative
history.17  Taxpayers will be required to exhaust administrative reme-
dies 73 and substantially prevail in proceedings in order to receive an
award for damages.74 The language of amended section 7430 is not sub-
stantially different from its predecessor. Therefore, courts will continue
to rely upon its conflicting legislative history and inconsistently interpret
section 7430.
166. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
167. See Miller, supra note 135, at 377. Miller highlights the appellate courts varying in-
terpretations of section 7430. The Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal have interpreted section 7430 narrowly and have awarded few litigation costs to taxpay-
ers. See Baker v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 637, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Ewing v. Heye, 803
F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1986). In contrast, the First and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal have in-
terpreted section 7430 broadly and have been inclined to award taxpayers fees. See Powell v.
Commissioner, 791 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1986); Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985).
168. Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 3101(d), 112 Stat. 728.
169. Id.
170. See Horvitz & Hebble, supra note 129, at 5 (citing Technical Explanation of Com-
mittee Amendment, 127 CONG. REC. S15594 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981)).
171. "Generally, the pursuit of litigation by the government to establish a conflict among
the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals would not be unreasonable." H.R. REP. No. 97-
404, at 12 (1981).
172. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
173. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 3102(a)(2), 112 Stat. 730.
174. See I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(II) (1997).
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2. The Effectiveness of Amended Section 7433 as a Civil Remedy
Previously, section 7433 contained provisions that unfairly restricted
the factual circumstances under which a taxpayer could be awarded
damages.175 The Reform Act removed only some of these restrictions.
Those that remain, however, will prevent taxpayers from collecting
damages to which they are entitled.
The Reform Act directly addressed one criticism of the section by
amending it to allow a taxpayer to bring suit against the government in
instances where an IRS employee has negligently disregarded a law of
the code.7' This negligence standard adopted by amended section 7433
will increase the number of instances where a taxpayer could file a cause
of action1 by imposing a burden upon the taxpayer that is more closely
aligned with the "knowingly, or by reason of negligence"'7 standard of
sections 7431 and 7432.179 Furthermore, by adding this language to the
statute, the IRS will no longer be able to avoid liability by simply show-
ing that its agents were negligently unaware of the code statute that they
have violated.'O
However, section 7433 will still be criticized because it limits awards
of damages to claimants. Taxpayers will remain limited to collecting the
lesser of $1,000,000 ($100,000 in instances of negligence)8 ' or the sum of
the taxpayer's "actual, direct economic" damages.'2
Additionally, section 7433 still applies only to the collection activities
of IRS employees."' As a result, a taxpayer has no cause of action for
damages where the IRS incorrectly assesses tax liability, yet utilizes cor-
rect collection procedures."' Section 7433's failure to authorize such a
175. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
176. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 3102(a)(1)(A), 112 Stat. 728.
177. See United States v. Toyota, 772 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that at most
IRS's actions constituted negligence and therefore taxpayer is not entitled to recover dam-
ages).
178. I.R.C. §§ 7431(a)(1), 7432(a) (1997).
179. See Sprouls, supra note 130, at 592 (comparing the standard necessary for liability
under section 7431 with that of section 7433).
180. See id. at 602. Sprouls believes that section 7433, as previously enacted, encouraged
a "shield of ignorance" where the IRS would inadequately inform its agents of collection laws
and thereby escape liability. Id.
181. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 3102(a)(1)(B), 112 Stat. 730.
182. Compare I.R.C. § 7433(b), with I.R.C. §§ 7430(a), 7431(c), 7432(b) (section 7433
caps damages to an actual, direct economic amount while the other sections impose no such
limitation); see also Sprouls, supra note 130, at 583.
183. See I.R.C. § 7433(a); supra note 145.
184. See Shaw v. United States, 20 F.3d 182 (1994) (holding taxpayer cannot seek dam-
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cause of action limits its ability to advance taxpayers' interests.
Lastly, amended section 7433 re-establishes the requirement that
taxpayers exhaust all available administrative remedies in order to ob-
tain a judgment for damages. 5 Previously, section 7433 stated that
damages "may be reduced if administrative remedies [are] not ex-
hausted.""' Amended section 7433 will likely be criticized because tax-
payers will encounter an additional burden in their attempts to collect
damages under the statute.l7
VI. ANALYSIS: ALTERNATE REFORM SUGGESTIONS
Before the Reform Act was signed into law by the President, a critic
of the legislation stood before the Senate Finance Committee and said
that it "was much less than meets the eye.""' Alternatively, this critic
suggested that the most effective means of reforming the IRS would be
"legislation of basic fairness and taxpayer respect." ' 9 In consideration
of these statements and the criticisms offered throughout this work,
Congress should consider modifying the Reform Act.
First, a modified Reform Act, one which requires the IRS to treat
taxpayers with greater fairness and respect, should assign the burden of
proof to the taxpayers in all court proceedings relating to the determina-
tion of a tax liability. A tax system assigning the IRS the burden of
proof will unfairly necessitate a greater amount of government intrusion
into the lives of taxpayers.19 Additionally, revenue collection will be
substantially impaired if the IRS bears the burden of proof.' Principles
of fairness and respect dictate that the burden of proof remain with the
taxpayer.
ages under section 7433 where IRS improperly assessed tax liability but engaged in proper
collection procedures). But see Sprouls, supra note 130, at 595 (citing Miklautsch v. Gibbs,
90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,587 (D. Alaska 1990) (rejecting government's argument that
section 7433 is inapplicable where procedurally correct collection methods are used, regard-
less of whether the underlying tax is correctly assessed)).
185. See Reform Act, supra note 4, at § 3102(a)(2), 112 Stat. 730.
186. I.R.C. § 7433(d)(1) (1997).
187. See Conforte v. United States, 979 F.2d 1375 (1992) (holding that taxpayer can not
sue under section 7433 without exhausting her administrative remedies); Sintz, Campbell,
Duke & Taylor v. United States, 197 B.R. 351 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that absent a showing
of exhaustion of remedies, law firm could not maintain a cause of action).
188. IRS Restructuring: Hearings on Internal Revenue Service Restructuring Before the
Senate Finance Comm., 105th Cong., (1998) (statement of Robert S. Schriebman) available in
1998 WL 47010.
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Reform Act was correct in creating the IRS Oversight
Board. A functioning Oversight Board consisting of a group of well-
qualified private life members will increase the IRS's accountability to
taxpayers by providing it with non-politically motivated advice and rec-
ommendations.'9 However, the legislation creating an oversight board
must be modified to provide its members with the direct authority to
formulate and enforce IRS policy. A board whose authority is limited
to recommending and reviewing policy is useless in a bureaucracy as
large as the IRS. '93
Third, the civil remedies available to taxpayers must continue to be
amended to authorize expanded damage awards. While the Reform Act
minimally enhances these remedies, it does not go far enough. Congress
should continue to modify phrases such as "substantially justified" and
"substantially prevailed" that unreasonably restrict the ability of tax-
payers to collect damages under section 7433. Additionally, the IRS
should not have its potential liability capped or limited to actual direct
economic damages. Instead, the IRS should be treated like any other
party found liable in a civil suit: It should pay an amount of money
equal to the wrong it inflicted.
Finally, Congress, in amending the civil remedies statutes, should be
motivated by the knowledge that these statutes provide necessary IRS
accountability, and not be deterred by a fear that they will open the
floodgates to fee recovery from the IRS."
VII. CONCLUSION
Taxpayers and politicians agree that the IRS needs to be reformed
to fairly and efficiently administer the tax system. However, the precise
means of such reform remains a mystery. The Reform Act will not ade-
quately reform the IRS because its provisions are not forceful enough to
affect the way the IRS does business. Until such legislation is enacted,
taxpayers must continue to live with an agency that is out of control.
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